

Future challenges in deniable encryption

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Hard drive encryption


- /dev/sda2: sticky LUKS encrypted file, ver 1 [aes, xts-plain, sha1] UUID: d747bbfe-816f-4010-b49c-2d04a54cd897
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_disclosure_law
- Britain: 2/5 years
- France: 3/5 years/€45k
- US: court in progress, border searches
- CZ: we will see...

A CRYPTO NERD'S IMAGINATION:

HIS LAPTOP'S ENCRYPTED.
LET'S BUILD A MILLION-DOLLAR
CLUSTER TO CRACK IT.

NO GOOD! IT'S
4096-BIT RSA!


BLAST! OUR
EVIL PLAN
IS FOILED!



WHAT WOULD ACTUALLY HAPPEN:


HIS LAPTOP'S ENCRYPTED.
DRUG HIM AND HIT HIM WITH
THIS \$5 WRENCH UNTIL
HE TELLS US THE PASSWORD.

GOT IT.




Deniable encryption

- Multiple passwords, multiple outputs
- Given N passwords, it's impossible to prove than N+1 passwords exist



TrueCrypt sucks

- vfat
- 2 volumes
- fragmentation
- write history




The past

- Rubberhose for Linux 2.0 and 2.2
- StegFS for Linux 2.2
- PhoneBook build 011, Jan 2004

but in November 2011....

DM-Steg

- Imagine a LVM PV, where you cannot list VGs/LVs
 - and they begin to appear when you type passwords
- infinite number of containers
- shuffling
- block stealing



Watch out!

- syslog
- /tmp
- recently-used
- ...
- → hidden operating system

Other ways of hiding data

- Free part of encrypted LVM PV (`losetup -o offset`)
- Noise (least significant bit) in WAV/FLAC/RAW photos

Does it help?

No.

(lawful enforcement → maybe)